Volume 13

Issue 1

12-1908

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 13, Issue 3

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 13, Issue 3, 13 DICK. L. REV. 75 ().
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol13/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON
LAW REVIEW
VOL. XIII.

DECEMBER, 1908.

EDITORS

No. 3

BUSINESS MANAGERS

H ATLEY L. RIPLOGLE
CLAiR N. GnAyBILL
HARRY E. MCWHIrNEY

JAMES F. SHIPMAN
J. CLARENCE FUNE
BEN. J. H. BRANCH

Subserption$1.25 per annum,payable in advance.

ADDRESS OF COUNSEL TO JURY.
In a civil case the nature of the issue is with more or less
precision defined by the pleadings, and upon one or the other
of the parties, there is a necessity of furnishing evidence, in
order to avoid an adverse verdict. When the party on whom
the pleas leaves the burden, has furnished evidence a risk
may fall on the opposite party, of a decision adverse to him,
unless he furnishes evidence which contradicts that of the
adversary, or which qualifies its legal effect. The evidence
must have relevancy, and a certain weight, in order to justify
a verdict in conformity with it. Should evidence of this relevancy and of this weight be wanting; since the jury cannot
properly find a verdict upon the evidence actually offered, the
consideration by the jury of the evidence would be useless,
and discussion of it would be objectless. Hence, if in the
trial a certain ground of recovery is presented, but the evidence would in the judgment of the trial court not justify a
verdict in favor of such ground, the court may properly prevent counsel from discussing the evidence, from that point of
view. In an ejectment, e. g., the plaintiff alleging that certain facts constituted the defendant a trustee of the land for
him, the court, if of opinion that the evidence would not support a finding predicated upon such a trust, may refuse to allow council.to argue to the jury, the existence of the trust.'
When a certain fact must be found, in order to sustain a verdict for a certain party, and there is evidence from which it
might be inferred, it is the right of the party who alleges the
fact ,by his counsel to address the jury upon the evidence tending to establish it; and it is the right of the opposite party
'Wilkins v. Anderson,

ix Pa. 399.
(75)
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to discuss the evidence, with a view to convincing the jury
that the fact cannot be properly found by it. The right of a
defendant in a criminal case, 2 to address the jury, is protected
not merely by common law principles, by the usages of the
courts, but also by the Constitution of Pennsylvania. "In
all criminal prosecutions tha accused hath the right to be
heard by himself and his counsel." The right thus secured,
is not simply that of objecting to evidence offered against him,
or of presenting evidence favorable to him. It embraces the
right to discuss the evidence, and to convince the jury that
from it they should not reach a verdict of guilty. It is a right
available in prosecutions for all sorts of crimes, the comparatively trivial, no less than the grave. It is violated when,
in a prosecution for the unlawful selling of liquor, at the close
of the evidence the court announces that the case will be submitted without argument, and, the counsel for the defendant
asking for his constitutional right to present the case to the
jury, the court refuses to allow discussion, saying, "there is
nothing in the judgment of the court to justify wasting time
arguing. '
INTRODUCTORY SPIECHES.

It is possible that in most courts, the plaintiff begins the
proceedings before the jury by stating the nature of the claim.
Even when the defendant's affirmative plea puts on him the
burden of proving something, to nullify the l'rinzafacieright
of the plaintiff, it is not usual in most courts, for him to make
the first observations to the jury, although it would not be
illegal for him to do so. In such a case the brief explanation of
the plaintiff, which is not to be followed by any contested evdeuce tendered by him, is immediately succeeded by remarks
of the defendant who outlines the defense and indicates how
he expects to establish it. In an action of trespass q. c. f.
the defendant pleaded liberum tenementum, and the plaintiff
replied, liberum tenemen/um suum, absque hoc, etc. The court
decided that the defendant must open the case, and furnish
evidence first, adding that "in all cases the party who is first
2The 9th section of the act of March 21St, i8o6, provides that in all
civil suits or proceedings in any court within this Commonwealth, every
suitor or party concerned, shall have a right to be heard by himself and
counsel or either of them."
'Stewart v. Com. 117 Pa. 378. Cf. Cathcart v. Com. 37 Pa. xo8.

DICICNSON LAW REVIEW
in the affirmative ought regularly to open".
was then given.

The evidence

THE ARGUMENTATIVE SPEECHES.

The preliminary speeches are, mainly, expository in character. Those of the plaintiff precede all the evidence, and
the materials for discussion do not yet exist before the jury.
When the evidence is presented by the party on whom the
burden is of first offering any, and the opposite party's turn
arrives, he makes a preliminary statement. In this he occasionally though improperly discusses the case thus far made
for the plaintiff, and reveals the nature of the evidence which
he is about to exhibit. When the evidence of both parties is
all before the jury that body frequently needs the aid of discussion of the credibility of witnesses, of the significance of
their testimony, of the probability or improbability of the hypotheses of the respective parties.
SEVERAL SPEECHES.

The rule of court may allow the party on whom is the
burden, to have two speeches. In that case, he first argues
to the jury upon the case as developed by the evidence. He
is followed for the opposite party by one or more counsel, according as the rule or order of court, allows, and then the
party who began has also the right to conclude the discussion. Often the party who is to make the closing speech, is
quite willing to make the opening argument also. But occasionly he may be averse to doing so. Can the opposite party
compel him to indulge in two addresses? In Mendenhall v.
Mendenhall' a rule of court prescribed that, if both parties
have given evidence, "the counsel, having the right on the
pleadings, shall begin, stating explicitly the grounds on which
he intends to rely, and citing such authorities as he deems pertinent, The counsel of the opposite party may then address the
jury. The counsel who opened, or his colleague, may conclude,
restricting himself to enforcing the grounds previously taken,
and answering the views of the opposite counsel, but when such
opposite counsel shall produce no testimony, the counsel open4

Leech v. Armatage,

2

Dall. 125.

The action was inter alia for the

value of trees that had been cut. Was the burden on the plaintiff to prove
what trees had been cut, and their value,-or did the plea admit the allegations of the declaration?
b12 Super. 290.
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ing shall be limited to his first address. The proceeding begun
by the husband was in divorce, founded on the charge of desertion by the respondent. The respondent attempted to justify
the desertion by the brad treatment she had received from the
libelant. The respondent's counsel insisted that the council for
the libelant should make the first address, stating the grounds
on which he relied. The court refused to compel him, and
he declining to make the first address, told counsel for the respondent to make his address. This address was followed by
the address of the counsel for libellant, which concluded the
discussion. In refusing to reverse the decree for the libelant,
the supreme court observed, (1) a mistake in prescribing the
order of address will not generally be cause for reversal, (2)
The court below is the best interpreter of its own rules, .and
when the rule pertains to the regulation of the business before
the court, a large discretion is accorded to it. (c) Since the
respondent, not denying the desertion, relied on the ill treatment of the libellant as a justification of it, she assumed the
affirmative of the issue. This last consideration however,
would have entitled her counsel to a second and concluding
speech, which he does not seem to have made, or claimed.
OPENING AND CLOSING COUPLED.

The right to be the first to explain to the jury the case
which is to be developed by the evidence and then to introduce
the evidence, and the evidence being all in, that of making
the final argument upon it, are usually coupled together, as
inhering in the same person. "Whoever," said the court, in
an early case, "supported the affirmative of the issue had the
tight to begin and conclude." 6 A somewhat different form was
given to the rule by Black C. J.: "The party whose duty it
is to begin the evidence, has a right to conclude the argument."
"These two rights are perhaps never separated. In those
courts which allow the party bearing the burden, not only
to begin the exhibition of the evidence, after an expository
speech, but to follow the evidence by two argumentative addresses, the first and the last', there is occasionally a modifi"Delany v. Regulators I Y. 403.
TRichards v. Nixon, 20 Pa. 19.
8

in Northampton County Nat. Bank v. Hay 5 Pa. C. C. 232, the right

of the party haring the burden to make two speeches, after the evidence
was in is recognized.
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cation of the last right, in cases in which the opposite party
has furnished no evidence. In traverse of an escheat, in
which the traverser who was the defendant, had furnished no
evidence, Brewster J. in disposing of a motion for a new trial,
remarked "The commonwealth would therefore. have been
privileged to commence and conclude to the jury, [i. e. after
the evidence was all in] but, the defendants having offered
no evidence, claimed, and under our uniform practice, was allowed to begin the addresses to the jury," that is in such cases
the party having the burden is limited to one address after
the conclusion of the evidence; that address being the final
one. Whether the defendant thus obtaining the right to make
the first of the argumentative speeches, had the right to make
a second, and the final one, is left in doubt by the remark of
Brewster J., that "The Commonwealth, however, concluded,
for, under an intimation from the court, the defendant's counsel very properly waived the right of reply." In Robeson v.
Whitesides' a scirefaciasto revive a judgment, it being agreed
that the merits of the original judgment might be inquired
into for some reason, the court decided that the defendant should, after the evidence was all in, make the flist argument to the jury, and that the plaintiff should conclude."
The rule cited sujhra of the Chester County court, provides
that when the party on whom the burden does not rest, produces no evidence, the counsel of the opposite party shall
have the first address to the jury but no other 1 , and a rule in
Delaware county gives a defendant who furnishes no evidence
the right to make the closing address". In an action for personal
injuries, the defendant by abstaining from putting in evidence
won this right. If the court inadvertently allows the defendant to begin the presentation of the evidence thinking he has
the burden of proof, it may subsequently refuse to him the
right to conclude the argument to the jury" .
916 S. & R. 320. "If there was error in the ruling, it was held to be
damnum absque injuria.
"Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 12 Super, 290. A similar rule of the

Philadeiphia courts is cited in Swartz v. Ryan 112 Pa. 423. "When the
party not entitled to begin, shall produce no testimony, the counsel of the
other party shall be confined to his address in summing up, and shall not
reply."
be heard iff
12
Twaddell v. Chester Traction Co. 6 Del. 399.
LSwartz v. Ryan, 11 Pa. 423.
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WHAT PRINCIPLE REGULATES THE RIGHT OF BEGINNING.

The pleadings define the burden of proof, and indicate the
person who must lose unless he gives evidence. If, e. g., the
action is debt, or assumpsit, and the plea does not deny the
making of the debt or of the assumption, but conceding it,
alleges discharge by payment, etc., the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment if no evidence of the discharge is offered.
The burden of tendering evidence is upon defendant. He has the
right therefore, to explain the nature of his defence, and how
he expects to sustain it, and then to educe the testimony upon
which he depends. Inasmuch as the right of beginning is in
the absence of a peculiar rule of court, invariably coupled
with that of making the last argumentative address, the principle which decides who has the first right will likewise decide who has the last.
THE PLIEA OF PAYMENT.

In actions in which the plea of payment is appropriate,
such plea tacitly concedes the right of the plaintiff to recover
what he claims, unless he has been paid it or a part of it.
The burden is not by the plea, put on the plaintiff of disproving the alleged payment, but it is put on the defendant.
The defendant
No burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
therefore has the right to begin the presentation of the evidence, and as incident thereto, to make the preliminary address, and also to make the last of the argumentative addresses, after the reception of all the evidence. This principle has been applied in debt to recover a legacy", in an-appeal
from a judgment of a justize of the peace, in favor of one who
5
claimed compensation for domestic services' . In a feigned
been paid, the
had
whether
a
judgment
determine
issue to
6
with leave,"
.
"Payment
to
conclude'
defendant has the right
' 4lngils v. Ingils, 2 DalI. 45; Northampton County Natioual Bank, v.
Hay, 5 Pa. C. C. 232.
15 Staub v. Wolf 4. Penny. 28o. But, the payment was proved by a release of the plaintiff, and the great effort was on her part to show that it
was obtained by fraud. The court 'therefore allowed her counsel to conclude6 the argument.
1 Horner v. Hower, 49 Pa. 475. An error alleged by the plaintiff was
that the court refused to him the "commencement and conclusion," meaning probably, the first and third speeches after the evidence was in. The
supreme court is silent on the subject. Cf. Sheehau v. Rosen, 12 Super. 298.
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etc., is like payment, an affirmative plea, and has the same
effect on the right to begin and conclude'.
If the meaning
of the plea of payment is so qualified by the agreement of the
parties or by their practical interpretation of it, that it allows
the burden to abide on the plaintiff to support his claim, it
will not take from the plaintiff the right to conclude. Under
a scirefaciasupon mechanics' liens it was agreed that the
defendant should plead "payment," but also that the plaintiff
should be allowed to dispute the doing of the work, within
the contract time, etc. The defendant produced evidence
tending to prove that the plaintiff had wantonly and maliciously delayed the work, causing loss sufficient in magnitude,
to equal the claim. This, it was considered by the trial court,
put on the plaintiff a burden, and he was properly allowed to
make the first and third speeches in argument to the jury.
Says Trunkey J., "It was obvious that the parties were prepared to contest and did contest a matter which the defendant
could not have introduced without a plea having the effect of
a general issue plea. Doubtless the learned court understood
the parties intended to try the case on its merits, when he
reserved the question as to the right to begin and conclude
until he could ascerltain whether the burden rested on the
plaintiff to prove performance of his contract * * *
The
real contract was about a matter only admissible by treating
the plea as accompanied by notice. That matter was in no
sense a payment on the price of the work; it struck
at the foundation of the action, and put the plaintiff to proof
of performance in order to establish his right to recover the
contract price. The record shows only the plea of payment,
and upon the letter of the rule of court, the defendant was entitled to begin and conclude * * * But as the parties
tried the case upon its merits and the evidence was offered and
admitted without regard to the form of the plea the court
rightly observed the spirit of its rule of practice."' 8 On an
appeal by the defendant ofrom a judgment of a justice of the
peace, for the yalue of personal services rendered by the
plaintiff, the plea and defence was payment, and as proof of
this, were offered a receipt and release by the plaintiff. She

'7Com. vs. Contner. 21 Pa. 266.
'8Smaltz v. Ryan, 112 Pa. 423. See remarks of Trunkey J.as to meaning of the plea of payment with leave.
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furnished evidence as to the fraud practiced on her, in the obtaining of this lease. The court allowed her counsel to conclude the argument before the jury, because, in view of the
course of the trial, "it is not clear to us that the plea in this
case is affirmative, in the sense contemplated by the law,
where the defendant is entitled to close."' 19.
PAYMENT WITH OTHUR PLEAS.

The plea of payment may be coupled with other pleas.
If these other pleas are likewise affirmative, imposing the
burden of proving their truth upon the defendant, he will
have the right to conclude to the jury. In an action of debt
upon a sheriff's official bond' for neglect in executing aft. fia.,
the pleas were, payment with leave, etc., and covenants performed. Although the plaintiff was obliged to give evidence,
to prove the non-performance by the sheriff, of his duties, the
court allowed the defendant's counsel to make the first and
third (and final) arguments to the jury, at the conclusion of
the presentation of the evidence. The supreme court did not
see that any wrong was done, but, in any case, an error in that
respect "would not be cause for reversal." In an action on a single bill2' for the price of carpenter Work done on the defendant's
house, the pleas were payment, payment with leave, etc.; and
bankruptcy. The defendant relied upon the discharge in
bankruptcy, which the plaintiff attempted to avoid because
it was procured by fraud. The court allowed the defendant's
counsel to make the last speech. Black C. J., affirming, said
"The party whose duty it is to begin the evidence has a right
to conclude the argument; It can only be determined by a
reference to the pleadings. In this case there were two pleas.
payment and bankruptcy. To the first the replication was
non solvit, and we are not informed how the other was met on
the record. We presume everything against a plaintiff in er19Staub v. Wolfe, 4 Penny. 28o. The Supreme Court simply said that
that court "will not reverse a judgment because the court below erred in
prescribing the order in which counsel should address the jury."
2nCom. v. Contner, 21 Pa. 266.

2Richards v. Nixon2 20 Pa: x9. The real controversy was as to whether
the discharge was void for fraud and in showing that it was there was a
heavy burden on the plaintiff. The discharge could be proved by a record;
but the facts averring it were difficult to prove. If real rather than formal
burden were decisive, the court might sensibly have given the conclusion to
the plaintiff.
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ror whose paper-book is defective and therefore we take it for
granted that the plea of bankruptcy was also traversed, and
that both issues. threw the burden of commencing the proof
on the defendalt. This presumption is strengthened by the
course which the trial took. The discharge was objected to
when it was offered in evidence, and its admission is assigned for error to this court. Here then, were two affirmative pleas, both denied by the plaintiff, and both to be supported by the defendant. Nothing can be plainer than the
right of the defendant to open2 and close. But, if the decision had been wrong in this respect, we are not inclined to
believe that any judgment ought to be reversed for such an
error."
THE FORMER ACTION OF COVENANT.

The plea of "covenants performed," which was pertinent
in the action, now abolished, of covenant, was treated as an
affirmative plea. In a covenant on a policy of marine insurance, the defendant having pleaded "covenants performed,"
the court said, "The-plea is affirmative, and as it rests on the
defendants, there is no doubt but they shall begin and conclude." But, when to the plea "covenants performed" the defendant added the words "absque hoc etc," he not only affirmed
his own performance, but denied the plaintiffs' performance
of the covenants into which he had entered, and non-performance of which excused altogether or in part the performance
of the defendant of his covenants. Hence, under such a 'lea,
the burden remains upon the plaintiff to prove performance,
and he is entitled to the "conclusion to the jury" i. e., to the
last argument.2 '
ISSUE DUVISAVIT VIL NON.

In an issue to decide whether a will was executed under
undue influence, fraud or imposition; and whether the testatrix fully understood the dispositions in the will, the executor and principal legatee was made plaintiff, and tie contestants defendants. Their counsel was allowed to close the ar"There was no controversy as to the opening of the evidence, nor as to
the opening of the summing up at the conclusion of the evidence.
"Norris v. Ins. Co. 3 Y. 84, The contest, at the conclusion of the evidence, was, "as to who should conclude."
"'Smith v. Frazier, 53 Pa. 226.
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gument to the jury, because the burden was on them. "It
was for them," said Green J. approving the decision of the
trial court, "to satisfy the jury as to the truth of their allegations [as to improper influence], and there was therefore
propriety in awarding to their counsel the right to begin and
conclude the final argument to the jury. '
UJRCTMtNT.

In the action of ejectment it was in 1793, said that the
plaintiff's counsel have uniformly concluded to the jury without regard to the nature of the defence, and the amount of
laborwhich its establishment casts upon him. Hence, plaintiff claiming as heir at law, being the eldest son of the eldest
brother of the person last seized, and the defendant by a deed
from the person last seized, which was impeached on the
ground of the grantor's insanity and of the grantee's (defendant's) misrepresentations, the final address was accorded to
the plaintiff"a. In a recent case in 1900 the earlier decision
was adhered to. The plaintiff showed a "good paper title"
which was admitted. Defendant claimed that the plaintiff
held subject to a parol trust for X, his heirs, through whom
defendant claimed. The trial court, though conceding that
the burden was on the defendant, deferred to the authority of
McCausland v. McCausland, decided over a century before,
but corroborated by immunity from subsequent question. 2 7
DIVORCE

PROCRDrNGS.

In proceedibgs fpr divorce in which libelant alleged desertion by his wife, she defended, on thee ground that his conduct had compelled it.
He put in evidence of the desertion,
and she, presumably, of his miscondnct. The court compelled the counsel for the respondent to address the jury, without the advantage of a prior argument by the counsel of the
libellant, and, apparently, subject to the right of the latter to
follow him and conclude'.
RUPLUVIN.

The plea of "property" in replevin though in a sense an
affirmative plea, does not discharge the plaintiff even- if the
25BIume
v. Hartnan, 1i5 Pa. 32.
26McCausland v.,McCausland, I Y. 303.
21Von Storch v. Von Storch, 196 Pa. 545.
learned
court below "did not err."
8

2Mendenhall v. Mendenhall

12

Super.

290.

McCollum J. said that the
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defendant fails to sustain the plea, of the necessity of establishing some facts; e.g. that the defendant has the property in his possession; that the plaintiff has the right to the
possession. It would not follow from the defendant's not being the owner, that the plaintiff is the owner, or, for some
reason has the right to the possession. "Seeing then," says
Kennedy J. "that the burden of proof still lies on the plaintiff
in replevin, notwithstanding that the defendant relies solely
on the plea of property, I am inclined to think that the order
of the court below, [viz: denying to the defendant the right
to commence the presentation of evidence and to conclude the
argument to the jury] was in conformity to the rule of practice in this particular'.
TRfISPASS-QUARn CLAUSUMI PREGIT.

The plea of liberum tenementum it has been held is an
affirmative plea, despite the logic of Marsh v. Pier. Failure
to establish it still leaves something for the plaintiff to establish. Yet it has been decided that the duty rests on the
defendant who has so pleaded, to begin the presentation of
the evidence. It would follow that he has the right to make
the closing address".
TRAvIMsn

OV INQUISITION IN USCHEAT.

When in escheat proceedings, the result of the inquisition is, a finding which appropriates to the state property of
a decedent on the ground that he is survived by no heirs
or next of kin, and a traverse to the inquisition with pleas is
filed, by persons claiming to be heirs, and there is a trial before a jury, it is held by King J, in 1835, that the traverser is
entitled to begin the discussion upon the evidence and to conclude to the jury. "The Commonwealth," he said, "assimilating the case to an ejectment, is in possession by virtue of
the inquest found. It is incumbent on the party who traverses the inquisition, to show a better title". A different view
31 Com. v.. Desilver, 2"Ash. 163. In McClure v. Mausell, 4 Brewst, 119
assumpsit on a promissory note, the defense was that the note was procured by improper influence upon an insane or drunken person; that there
was a conspiracy between the plaintiff and her sister to obtain the defendant's money. The burden qf proving these facts was on the defendant.
The court however, allowed the plaintiff to close. The plea is not stated.
"Marsh v. Pier, 4 R. 273.
"OLeech v. Armitagei2 Dall. 125. The plaintiff's reply was liberum
tenementum suum absgue hoc, etc.
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(though he denies the difference) was taken by Brewster J.
in 1869. He denied that, in escheat proceedings, the burden
is on the traverser. "The onus before the jury of twelve" he
affirmed, "is precisely where it was before the first jury. The
proceeding is as on appeal de novo, and it would be as unreasonable to require a defendant, in escheat, to disprove the
information, as it would be to require the appellant from an
alderman's judgment, to prove that the plaintiff had no claim.
The decision on the traverse, being for the traverser, the
commonwealth asked for a new trial inter alia because the
court had compelled the commonwealth to prove its case, and
had afterwards decided that the traverser should be permitted
to begin the argument, and to conclude it, to the jury. The
traverser having given no evidence, the court, under the rule
of court, had allowed him to begin the argument, but under
an intimation from the court, he had "very properly waived
the right of reply" to the argument of the commonwealth.
Virtually, therefore, the court had simply deprived the commonwealth on whom was the burden, of one of the customary
two speeches, allowing it however, to make the last
speech 2 .
AT']TACHMZNT IN

UXICUTION.

In execution of a judgment against X, an attachment
was issued under which his right to receive on the death of
the widow of his father, the principal sum,the interest of which,
as dower, had been payable to her in her lifetime was attached.
Z interpleaded, alleging that X had assigned his right to the
money to her, Z. On the trial of the interpleader, counsel for
Z asked to be allowed to begin and to conclude to the jury.
The court concluding that the burden was'substantially on
Z, allowed her counsel to begin and conclude. The defense
admits, said Reed-er J.the former title of X, and the right of
the attaching creditor to recover, unless there was a valid
assignment to Z. The burden is on Z to prove this assignment, that it was for value, and that she had sufficient money
(being at the time the wife of X), of her own' to pay the consideration."
"2Com. v. Hoe; 26 Leg. Int. 124.
"Northampton County Nat. Bank v. Kay, 5 Pa. C. C. 232.
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SCIRE VACIAS TO REVIVE JUDGMENT.

After several rules and pleas, it was agreed by the parties
that the merits of the original judgment should be tried, without regard to the form of pleading The court ordered that
the defendant should make the first address after the conclusion of the evidence, to the jury, and that the plaintiff should
conclude. The Supreme Court declined to say whether this
order was corrects' .
SPECIAL ISSUE.

An issue was framed to ascertain the distance of the north
side of Dock Street, Philadelphia, from the south side of Walnut Street, on the east side of Second Street. The court observed, a dispute arising between counsel as to who had the
right to conclude to the jury, that whoever supported the affirmative of the issue had the right to begin and conclude.
Here the onus 25robandi lay on the regulators. They then,
though defendants in the issue, had the right to conclude"5 .
TWO PLEAS, ONE OF WHICH IS NEGATIVE.

The-defendant may file a plea which avers new matter,
and which he must therefore sustain by evidence, and another
which negatives all or some of the allegations upon which
the plaintiff seeks to recover. In such a case, since a burden
still remains upon the plaintiff, he is entitled to close the discussion before the jury, although there is also a burden on the
defendant. In debt against executors, to recover a legacy,
the executors pleaded "payment" and nil debent." The real
question was which of two virtual assignees of the legacy was
entitled to it. A dispute between counsel, after the evidence
was in, concerning the right of beginning the discussion before the jury, was settled by the court's declaration that when
there are two pleas one of which requires proof by the plaintifi, he shall always open the cause.
The plea of nil debent
'Robeson v. Whitesides 16 S. & R. 320.
ssDelaney v. Regulators of City of Philadelphia; I Y. 403. In
Sheehan v. Roslen, 12 Super. 298, a judgment was opened and defendant let into a defence. He said it had been paid. Plaintiff alleged
that the parties had agreed that it should remain as security for advances
of goods to be made, and that those advances had been made. The court
allowed the defendant to open and close the discussion before the jury.
Whether the decision was correct is not intimated,
'Ingles v. Ingles, 2 Dall. 45.
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denied the allegation of the plaintiff, and therefore required
him to prove the debt. In an action of covenant, the pleas
were "payment with leave, etc", and "covenants performed
absque hoc, etc. The latter denies the performance by the
plaintiff without which he cannot recover, and which heavers
himself to have done. Hence, the plaintiff had the right to
conclude to the jury"
SHIFTING THE BURDEN.

Some of the cases already considered, indicate that the
plea, while indicative of the party on whom some burden rests,
does not exclude the existence of another burden, that is on
the opposite party. When there are two pleas, one negative
and one affirmative, this is true, So, although the written
plea puts the burden on one party, the actual course of the
evidence may "shift" the burden, in the sense that, if it is
not encountered by other evidence, the decision will be adverse to a certain party. In some cases, the court has considered the whole evidence, and finding that the larger difficulty
of persuasion is with one of the parties, has conferred on him
the right to conclude the discussion before the jury. In other
cases the court, despite the onerousness of the defendant's
defence, refuses to give him the final speech. In Patterson v.
Marine National Bank' the suit was for a deposit by the depositor. The bank alleged that the plaintiff was a mere agent;
that the mbney belonged to X his principal, and that it had-paid
the money on X's checks. The burden of proving this ownership of X was serious, and it was on the bank. The court
refused without error, to allow its counsel to close the case to
the jury.
WHY THE LAST SPEECH IS APPRECIATED.

Various reasons may be assigned for the desire to secure
the last speech, all more or less derogating from the character
of the jury or the judge, (as a trierof facts). They presuppose a shortness of memory, a subjection to the last impres3

1Smith v. Frazier, 53 Pa 226.
Pa. 419. In Blume v. Hartman, u15 Pa. 32, an issue concerning a
will in which the contestants were made defendants, but were allowed to
close to the jury, the trial court made sundry observations, concerning the
shifting of the burden during the progress of a trial contingent on a finding
of certain facts by the jury, which finding could not be known in advance,
and was itself a part of the general duty of the jury.
3I3o
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sion, etc. Rogers J. said, 80 years ago, "Counsel consider
the last word to the jury, as of some consequence; sometimes
it enables them to remove, and sometimes to create false impressions on the minds of the jury; but, every inconvenience of
this kind, it is presumed, is attended to and prevented by the
charge of an upright and able court.":" In some states, the
order of speaking has been deemed so important that a statute
has regulated it. Justice Miller of the Supreme Court of the
United States is quoted as saying that, when two speeches
were to be made on the side on which he was counsel, he preferred to make the first. "It was my practice, contrary to
that of most lawyers, who had the right of choice, to open
the argument rather than to close it, where two speeches were
to be made on the same side."" "Most lawyers" will probably
be thought wiser than one lawyer, though he subsequently
becomes Justice Miller. Chitty" calls the right to open and
close "a privilege which a powerful pleader can exercise with
great advantage." A little observation and reflection will
detect the advantage of being able to discuss all the speeches
that have been made, and of not being followed by those who
in turn, can criticise the discussion. A futile remark was once
made by Black C. J., suggestive that the last word is more
important to the English than to the American lawyer. Remarking that a mistake of the trial court in fixing the order
of speech is here not an error for'which the appellate court
would reverse, he says: "It is true, the English" cases say otherwise," and he pretends to explain the difference between the
practice in the two countries by a wholly meaningless and
baseless observation: "There (in England) very much depends on having the last word, and more still on having the
right to begin. But, an English trial bears so little resemblance to an American one, that their decisions on a point like
If there
this are entitled to no weight whatever with us."'
is any difference between the countries, the right to the con•Robeson v. Whitesides, 16 S. & R.
402

Elliott, Gen. Prac.

320.

620.

"Chitty, Gen. Prac. 872' 2 Hartman v. Keystone-Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466. Strong J. mildly observes
the remarks of Black, C. J. were "not necessary to the decision of the
tfiat
case thenibefor2 the court.', Smith v. Frazier, 53 Pa. 226. In Cook v.
Folson, s Del. 314; 2 -Lanc. i85;.the trial judge thought that in a doubtful

case, the right to conclude was valuable.
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cluding speech is more important in America than in England, because here, in some states, commenting on the evidence by the judge is wholly forbidden by the law, and in
others, it is the habit of judges being much more deferential
to the lawyers, to less willingly disturb the impressions made
by them, than in England, where the judges' views tell much
more powerfully with the jury. The effect of the last speech
is more apt to be puffed away by the trial judge, than here.
CHANGING THE PLEA, IN ORDER TO GAIN RIGHT TO CONCLUDE.

Since the nature of the plea is often decisive as to who
shall have the right to begin, it is often advisable for the defendant, in selecting his plea, to confine himself to those of
an affirmative sort, if in doing so, he does not make too important concessions, and, having filed negative pleas, it may
be to his advantage to substitute for them positive pleas. If
the application to change the pleas is not made until a short
time before or during the trial, the plaintiff may have been
put to expense and trouble in preparing to support the case,
which the original plea has denied. If, e.g. in assumpsit the
plea has been non-assumpsit, the plaintiff has probably at expensemade preparation to establish the assumpsit. If the object
of the change of plea is merely to win the right to make the
closing speech, the court will not allow the change. In 1791,
the plaintiff having pleaded both assumpsit and payment,
asked leave to withdraw the former, apparently to have the
cosclusion to the jury. The court, not deciding that in no
case could the plea be changed, refused to allow the change
because the application was not made in time". In this case,
both pleas were in. The plaintiff had, presumably, prepared
not only to prove the assumpsit, but also to refute the defendant's evidence of payment. It could cause him no inconvenierice, for the defendant, at the trial, to notify him that the
assumpsit would not be disputed. But the bias in favor of
giving the plaintiff the closing address was too strong to be
OWikoff v. Perot, I Y. 37.

How soon before trial the application was
205, 2 Y. 329
the pleas were non-assumpsit and payment When the jury was about to be
empannelled a motion to strike out the first plea was made. Plaintiff objected, alleging that he had sent a commission to another state toprove the
sale and delivery of the goods, for which the suit had been brought. The
motion was refused.

made does not appear.

In Jackson v. Winchester, 4 Dall.
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overcome, when the defendant was so tardy in announcing
his intention to rely-solely upon payment. This case was decided before the act of March 21st, 1806, the 6th section of
which enacts that the "defendant may alter his plea or defence, on or before the trial of the case," when, in the opinion of the-court, the merits of the case may require. The
court must judge whether the change of plea is necessary to
conserve the merits of the case. Hence, in debt on a bond,
the pleas being von estfactum and payment, the court properly
refused, on the day preceding the trial, to allow the withdrawal of the plea of non est factum. The counsel for defendant averred, in the Supreme Court, that his object was
simply to obtain the last speech. The change was not required by the merits. Hence the case was not covered by the
act of 1806. But under the earlier law, the court refused permission to strike out a plea, when striking out was a mere
stratagem of the defendant, who, "having first taken the
chance of the plaintiff's not being able to procure witnesses
to prove the deed, and put him to the expense and trouble of
bringing witnesses, all at once assumes the appearance of candor, in relinquishing a defence which could not be supported,
but in 4reality with a view of gaining the last speech to the
jury."

DROPPING ONE PLIEA, CONTINUED.

The original plea may be composite, both affirmative and
negative. The negative part of it compels the plaintiff to
prove his case, but for that reason, secures to him the right
to conclude the argument. In an action of trespass in 1825
for entering a close and cutting down trees, the original plea
was "not guilty, with leave to give title in evidence." This
not only secured to the defendant the right to give his title
in evidence, but denied the trespass. An application shortly
before the trial for leave to withdraw the plea, and substitute
for it liberum tenementum, was properly refused. "The alteration" said Duncan J. "did not give to the defendant any substantial meritorious advantage; he could have given the same
evidence on the first plea, as the one desired to be substituted.
It would give him the benefit of a reply, the last word and
nothing more." "This" adds the justice, "has constantly
44Waggoner v. Line, 3 Binn, 589.
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been refused"". Five weeks before the trial of an action of
covenant on a life insurance policy, a rule was obtained to
show cause why the defendant should not be allowed to amend
the plea, which was "covenants performed absque hoc, etc", by
omitting the words absque hoc, etc." and to file special pleas;
averring suicide of the assured, and that his occupation was
slave catching. The court, after the case was called for trial,
allowed the amendments. Not reversing Black C. J. states
that the amendment of a plea ought not to be allowed, where
the object is to get the conclusion of 'the argument, or to put
on the plaintiff the burden of proving a fact not previously in
issue. It is also suggested, that if a court having allowed an
amendment of the plea, discovers that the object was merely
to gain the last speech, it may give the conclusion to the plaintiff notwithstanding

*
CHANGING THE PLEA.

In an action of debt on a lease, nildebet was pleaded. Defendant obtained a rule, returnable on the Saturday preceding
the Monday on which the case had been set down for trial,
to show cause why the plea should not be changed into a
special plea that he had surrendered the premises before the
alleged cause of action arose. The application was held too
late. The proposed change of plea could not affect the merits
since the surrender could be shown under the plea of nil debel.
The only object of the rule was to secure the last word before
the jury to the defendant".
EFFECT IN APPELLATE COURT OF IMPROPER ALLOWANCE OF LAST
SPEECH.

Important as many lawyers deem the privilege of last addressing the jury, it is a privilege which is not under the
guardianship of the appellate courts. StrongJ. in 186648 said
that "if the question were an open one, we should probably
be of opinion that- the right to conclude in such a case is a
legal right, of which a party cannot be deprived at the discretion of the court," and, the court below having improperly
refused to defendant the last speech to the jury, intimated
"Weidman v. Kohr, 13 S. & R. 17.

6'Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co.
defendant.
4'Chillas
48

v. Hansbury, 17 Phila.

Smith v. Frazier, 53 Pa.

226.

21

Pa. 466. The judgment was for the

107.
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that "we might therefore feel constrained to reverse this
judgment and send the case back for a new trial, were it not
for what has heretofore been decided." He concluded that it
had been decided that an error of the trial'court in this matter
could not be corrected in the appellate court. 9 Occasionally
the Supreme Court has considered whether the order was correct, and concluded that it was without suggesting that, if
found incorrect, it would not justify a reversal'. In Sheehan
v. Rosen 5' the court remarked that no case had been cited
where an erroneous ruling as to the order of addressing the jury
had 'been a cause of reversal.
MISTAKE AS CAUSE FOR NEW TRIAL.

The trial court, on a motion for a new trial, has' refused
to consider any mistake in the order as to the pdrty who
should make the last speech, a sufficient reason for a new
trial ; e. g., a decision that the defendant in an action for
personal injury, not giving any evidence, had, under the rule
of the court of Delaware county, a right to close to the
jury.' In Cook v. Folsom,' the court admitted that it was
wrong in framing a feigned issue, to dispose the parties, as
they were disposed, and thus to secure to the plaintiff, who
should have been defendant, the concluding address; but refused a new trial because it had no doubt of the correctness of
the verdict. In a traverse of the inquisition in an escheat
proceeding, Brewster, J., intimated that a new trial should
not be granted for mistake in its order concerning the addresses to'the jury.'
4

0Citing Marsh v. Pier, 4 R. 284. Hartman v. Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466.
Robeson v. Whitesides, 16 S. & R. 320. See, also, McClure v. Mausell, 4
Brewst, tig; Staub v. Wolf, 4 Penny, 28o; Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. 32;
Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. 419, Com. vs. Contner, 21 Pa, 266.
5
Smaltz v. Ryan, 112 Pa. 423; Horner v. Hower, 49 Pa. 375; cf. Van
Storch v. Van Storch, x96 Pa. 545.
5112 Super, 298. The trial court allowed the defendant, in the trial,
after a judgment had been opened, to-ascertain what was due, to make the
opening and closing addresses to the jury after the conclusion of the evidence.2
' Twaddell v. Chester Traction Co. 6 Del. 399.
'2 Del. 314; 2 Lanc. 185. A landlord issued a writ of estrepement to
prevent the tenant's removal of machinery. Upon a motion to dissolve the

writ, a feigned issue was granted. The tenant was inadvertently made
plaintiff, and the landlord defendant. The tenant, as plaintiff, concluded to
54
the jury.
Com, v. Hoe,

26

Leg. Int.

124.
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LIMITING THB TIME OF SPEAKING.

The right of addressing the jury might be substantially
violated by a limit ition of the length of the speech: Yet, on
the other hand, counsel might waste the time of the court and
jury, by intolerably prolix and irrelevant discussion. The
Court has the function of presiding over the trial, and it must
have the power to prescribe limits to the time consumed in
speaking to the jury. For a restriction of the address of
the prisoner's counsel to two hours, in a murder case, if in the
judgment of the supreme court, it is not unreasonable, there
will be no reversal."
"Com. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535.

MOOT COURT.
AfIOS flINKLE vs. THOS. DARLINOTON.
Ejectment-rlaternal and Paternal Inheritance.
Facts of the case are found in the opinion of the court.
HARRIsoN for Plaintiff.
MAGRADY

for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
MAYO, J.-From the facts it appears that John Darlington died seized
of certain real estate which he had purchased from his father for the sum
of fifty dollars. His only surviving heirs were Amos'Hinkle and Thomas
Darlington, uhcles on his mother's and father's sides respectively. Darlington holds the land and denies Hinkle's right-to any of it. This is ejectment
by Hinkle to recover an undivided half of the realty. It also appeared that
the land was valued at$10,000 at the time of the gale by father to son for
$50.00.
Under this set of facts it is clear that the plaintiff must prevail in this
action. 'The defense offered is, that'the land was a gift from the father"
to the son and that upon the son's death, intestate, the property goes to the
one having the blood of the first perquisitor under section 9 of the act of
April 8, 1833, P. L. 318, relating to Intestates' Estates.
It is true that the uncle on the father's side would be entitled to the
real estate of his nephew who died intestate had .such realty come into his
the nephew's hands by gift,- devise or descent from his father, but we have
found that the son paid the father the sum of $50 in consideration of his
deed. It is not for the court to attempt to say that this consideration was
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insufficient and the conveyance was a gift. It is enough that a consideration
was paid making the transaction a sale which takes it out of the statute
above referred to.
Ejectment is the proper action for one co-tenant against the other who
has deprived him of the possession of the land. Judgment is given for the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
"No person" says he act of April 8th, 1833, "who is not of the blood
of the ancestors or other relations, from whom any real estate descended
or by whom it Was given or devised to the intestate, shall, in any of the
cases before mentioned, take any estate of inheritance therein."
John Darlington is the intestate. He obtained the farm of which he
was seized at his death, from his father, William, by a conveyance. The
consideration paid by him was $50. The farm then did not descend from
William. Nor was it devised by William. Was it given by him? The
farm was worth $10,000. The price paid was one two-hundredths of its
value only. One hundred and ninety nine two-hundredths of its value
were a gift.
The donative disposition of the father seems however, not to have been
sufficient alone, to induce the conveyance. It needed the reinforement of
the consideration however insignificant it may to us seem. Love of the son
alone would not have procured the grant, but love plus the receipt of $50,
was effectual. But a conveyance induced in part by a valuable consideration, cannot be well described as a gift. In Walker v. Dunshee, 38 Pa. 430,
it was said that a widow to whom land was devised by her husband, became
a purchaser of it, because she took it in lieu of dower. But dower is an
interest in one third only, and that for life only, in this one third. The consideration therefore was but one ninth of the actual value of the land. It'is
hardtojustify the assertion that a conveyance for one two-hundredth of the
market value, is a gift, if a conveyance for one ninth of that value is a sale,
a purchase.
The ancestral property principle was found in the early English law.
Blackstone says of it that it cannot "otherwise be accounted for than
by recurring to feudal principles.' "The true feudal reason for which rule
was this; that what was given to a man for his personal service and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs of his person"
Pollock and Maitland however, 2 History of English Law, 298, question the feudal origin of the principle. They relate it to an effort to keep
a woman's land in her own family. Paterna paternis, materna maternis
was the well known maxim and its recognition they remark, "is a widely
distributed phenomenon?'
The legislation of 1833 cannot find an explanation in any feudal notions. It rests probably upon the sentiment that it is a hardship to allow
property that was acquired by the labor of A, and which his descendant
has without pecuniary consideration, to be switched over at his death from
those who have As blood, to one who though related by blood to A's descendants, is not related by blood to him.
This sentiment has but little to justify it. It is allowed but small
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scope in many states. There is no reason for allowing it to apply to a case
in which the element of gift is blended, in whatever ratio, with the element
of purchase. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Wfl. DOBSON, Adm. v. HENRY ADAMS, Adm.

Assumpsit on a Promissory Note-Presumption of payment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Yarnell lent $2000 to Win. Arnold, taking a promissory note for
it, payable in one year. Both Yarnell and Arnold have died, and (5). five
years have elapsed since the note became due. At Yarnell's death it was
found among his papers, and Dobson has retained it since. Evidence was
offered by the defendant that Dobson was in need of money; that Wh.
Arnold could have paid the note at any time; that Yarnell, on two occasions had received from third parties considerable sums for Arnold, once
$3000, once $1700, whicr he paid over to Arnold, saying nothing of any
debt from Arnold to him. In this assumpsit the jury found that the note
had been paid. This is a motion for a new trial.
HoWER for the Plaintiff
BRANcH for the Defendant.
OPINION, OF THE COURT.
BRUCE, J.-Yarnell and Arnold the parties to the note in question are
now dead, the note has been found among Yarnell's papers by his administrator who has since retained it and now as administrator of Yarnell has
brought an action for the amount of the note. In the course of the trial
below evidence was introduced on the part of the Defendant administrator
(a) that Dobson the administrator of Yarnell was in need of money; We
find in the study of evidence that the text writers with the help "df the
judges have tried to lay down some rule in regard to the admission of evidence so as to hold the minds of the jury upon the fact in question. They
have laid down the principle that all evidence in some manner must be confined to the issue, but they do not stop at this but allow evidence to be
introduced to show some fact which has a bearing in some-way upon the
fact in question. In the admission of the above evidence has either of
these rules been observed? The court thinks not. The fact that Dobson
was in -need, of money had no' bearing whatever upon the facts at issue.
This evidence tended to confuse the jury, and lead them from-the real facts
in the case. On trial of an action the evidence must be confined to the
issue raised by the pleadings. Greenleaf on Evidence Vol. 1, See 14
First Nat'l Bank of Carlisle vs. Graham 79 Pa. 106; Simpson vs. Irv:n
5 Superior Ct. 471.
Now we come to the second point, "That Win. Arnold could have paid
the note at any time.!' If there is any evidence at all which will prejudice
tfie jury we think evidence of such a character as this will. The mere
fact that a man can do a thing surely does not lay the foundation for say-
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ing that he did or did not do it. Why should it be said that if a man can
do a thing an inference can be drawn that he did it? We think the power
to pay has no connection at 'allwith the point at issue viz., did he pay.?
The third point: That Yarnell on two occasions had received sums
from third parties for Arnold which he had paid Arnold saying nothing
of his debt from Arnold to himself. From the conduct of Yarnell, it
cannot be presumed that. he had been paid. When Yarnell passed money
to Arnold for third parties he acted as agent for Arnold and probably had
no right to retain any part of the money for his own debt. We find that
the court below erred in admitting such evidence and award a new trial to
the Plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT..
The allowance of a new trial is not assignable as error. It may not
however be amiss to indicate our opinion as to the sufficiency of the reasons
for the court's action.
The possession by a payee, of a promissory not, is some evidence that
it has not been paid, because the maker of such a note generally insists
upon its return, when he pays it. But, he may omit to require its return,
and yet pay it. That paymerit can, like any other fact, be proved by circlear. Ability. to pay does not prove payment, but it lessens
umstances is.
the improbability of payment. The fact that Yarnell had twice received
moneys for Arnold, which he paid over in full, tends to persuade one that
he did not then think Arnold was indebted to him. It is more or less
prolziblb that had he thought Arnold indebted, he would have mentioned
the debt and proposed to retain it. Dobson was the administrator of Yarnull. Probably, had he as such, had need of money, he would have demanded payment long before he sued. But the evidence was that he personally, needed the money. This was a wholly irrelevant circumstance;
and proof of it should- have been excluded. But, can we believe that it
misled the jury? Not without imputinig to the jury a stupidity bordering
on fatuousness. A new trial should not be granted for the improper admission of evidence, unless the court thinks, that without the evidence the
verdict would probably have been different. 13 Pa. L. Dig. 22950. It is
hard indeed to believe that had -this evidence been rejected, the result
would have been different. Cf. McMichan's Estate, 220 Pa. 187.
HOFIER TALCOTT vs. FARtIERS & MECHANICS BANK.

Depositor flay Stop Payment of his Check-Check not an Equitable
Assignment

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Peters had on deposit $371.13 on June 11, 1907. This was a
balance left after several years' dealing with the bank, Buying a piano
from Talcott for $350, he told Talcotr that he would assign to him his
bank deposit by a check, Talcott paying him cash $21.13. He drew and
delivered the check, and Talcott paid him $21.13. He subsequently pre-
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sented the check for payment to the bank, which declined to pay because
not-fied not to pay it, by Peters. The money however is still in the bank.
This is assmupsit.
CHASE for the Defendant.
AMBROSE for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BENNER, J.-The weight of authority-both in England and in the
United States, holds that a check is not an assignment of the fund against
which it is drawn and will not, before acceptance implied or expressed,
support an action by the holder against the bank and is revocable until accepted or paid.
2 Randolph on Com. Paper, Par. 644.
The docrine prevailing in England and sustained by the weight of
authority in the United States is, that an unaccepted check, drawn in the
ordinary form, not describing any particular fund, or .using no words of
transfer of the whole or any part of any amount standing to the credit of
the drawer, is of the same legal effect as a bill of exchange and does not
amount to an assignment at law, or in equity of the money to the credit of
the holder, but is simply an order which may .be countermanded and the.
payment of which may be forbidden by the drawer at any time before it
is actually cashed.
2 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 1066.
The weight of authority in this country is that a chek may not operate
as an assignment so as to make a bank liable in action at law to the holder
of a check drawn upon it by a general depositor for its refusal to pay the
check though the bank has sufficient funds of drawer wherewith to pay it.
2 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 1906.
These principles we have taken to be decisive of this case. Peters
was a regular customer of the bank. He had been dealing with it for
years and there is no reason to suppose that he did not propose to continue his dealings. On June 11, 1907, he finds he has $371.13 in the bank
and wishing to pay for the piano and desiring some ready money he draws
his check for the whole amount and asks Talcott to give him the $21.13
difference in- cash. The facts say he assigned the amount by check to
Talcott. We infer that it .was just an ordinary check. There were no
special words of transfer used. Neither do we think that this check comes
within the other exception to the rule above, viz., that it was drawn qn a
particular fund. It was for the full amount of the deposit, it is true, but
the deposit was the result of general dealing with the bank and might have
been added to, or diminished by .check, before this particular one was presented for payment.
When the order is against a particular fund: "The transfer must be
of such a character that the fund holder can safely pay and is compellable
to do so, though forbidden by the assignor."
Christman vs. Russel, 14 Wall 69.
There is strong authority for the position that a check operates pro
tanto as an equitable assignment of the amount for which it was drawn, and
that payment cannot be stopped by the drawer arbitrarily or without cause.
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Counsel for the plaintiff has cited some of the leading cases holding
this droctrine.
But in many of the cases taking this position we think some special
grounds for the attachment of Equity may be found.
For example, in Risley vs. the Bank, 83 N. Y. 318, cited by plaintiff, the
United States government attached the funds in the bank upon confiscation
proceedings after the bank had accepted the check but before the payee
could secure proper identification. All three parties were agreed that the
check should be paid. The drawer had notice of the assignment and then
deliberately paid over the money to the marshall. It seems then that there
was some ground for Equity.
In Pease vs. Landauer, 63 Wis. 20, the drawer drew a check and charged the payee with the amount of the check on his books and credited the
bank with payment thereof, and such charge and credit remained on the
books of the firm up to the time of the action. A receiver was appointed
for the firm and before the check was presented the bank having notice
of the receivership refused.to pay the check. The action was by the payee
against the drawer's receiver but the court decided that in Equity the bank
should pay. The court here seems to have followed Lord Manfield's statement, "If two men agree for the sale of a debt and one of them gives the
other a credit in his books for th6 price, that may be a very good assign-ment in Equity." This fact may have had some influence on the court in
determining the case.
In Wheatley vs. Stroe, 12 CaL 92, the facts showed that the drawee
knew that the debt had been assigned by his drawer, and had agreed to
pay the sum over to the assignee.
While we are not prepared to say that all the authorities for equtable
assignment can be disiinguished from the case at bar, there, seem frequently
to be some circumstance which explains equitable interference.
In our case the bank is an entirely innocent and outside party to the
transaction. It knows nothing until the drawer notifies it not to pay a
check he has drawn in favor of Talcott for $371.13. This happens every
day in the course of the bank's business. How does it know that there has
been an assignment? Later Talcott presents a check and the bank of
course refuses to pay it. Then Talcott says "this is an assignment, you
can't refuse." The drawer may say it is not. What is the bank to do?
There is no evidence of an assignment. This is an ordinary check. The
bank naturally refuses to pay, and in this it is supported by the authorities.
The plaintiff seeks to recover on Eqitable principles. He ought then
to be willing to grant the defendant's Equity, and as between the two, we
think the defendant has the greater claim. Besides the plaintiff has an
equally satisfactory, and as we think, a more just remedy. The funds are
still in the bank. He may bring action against his assignor and summon
the bank as garnishee.
The English doctrine is presented in Hopkinson vs. Forster, L. R. 19,
Eq. 74. "A check is clearly not an assignment of money inthe hands of a
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banker. It is a bill of exchange payable at a banker's. The banker is
bound by his contract with his customer to honor the check when he has
sufficient assets in his hands. If he does not fulfill his contract, he is
liable in an action by the drawer in which heavy damages may he r.covered
if the drawer's credit has been injured.'
The supreme court of the United States has similarly held inFlorence
Mining Co. vs. Brown, 124 U. S. 385, "A check upon a bank in the usual
form, not accepted or certified by the cashier to be good, does not constitute an Equitable assignment of money to the credit of the holder, but is
simply an oder which may be countermanded and payment forbidden by the
drawer at any time before it is actually cashed.'
In Lord vs. McCaffrey, 46 Pa., 410, Strong J., said, "It cannot be
maintained that Taylor's check in favor of Wilson without more amounted
to an equitable appropriation of the funds in the hands of the bankers to
whom the check was addressed. To make an order or draft an equitable
assignment, it must designate the fund upon which it is drawn." The payment by Talcott of $21.13 to Peters is simply a part of the consideration for
the check together with the piano, and does not of itself increase Talcott's
-rights in the case.
Our conclusion is that Talcott has no claim either at law or in Equity
against the bank, according to the weight of authority, and consequently
that assumpsit will not lie.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It is not possible for us to accept the conclusion of the learned court
below, with respect to the transaction between Peters and Talcott :being
an assigmnent of the bank deposit of the former to the latter. That it was
their intention that the right to receive the money from tl~e bank should
instantly pass from Peters to Talcott, is indubitable, and that this intention
was appropriately expressed, both by what was said and by the drawing and
delivery of the check is equally so. Peters had -on deposit $371.13. This
surely he could assign. He was buying a piano for $350. Why did he not
draw a check for that amount leaving the balance $21.13 to be drawn at
some other time? Instead, he draws a check for $371.13, the entire deposit,
;md he receives $21.1-3. Could any thing be more significant of his intention
to sell the deposit to Talcott, and of Talcott's intention to buy it in other
words, of the intention of the parties that the fund should be assigned?
Taylor's Estate, 154 Pa. 183; Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. 545.
The learned court below suggests that the plaintiff's proper remedy is
to sue Peters, obtain a judgment -and attach the deposit. But long before
that Peters Aiay have withdrawn it.
The bank's difficulty to know whether to pay to Peters or to Talcott
is the difficulty which the obligor is often in, when the obligee and the
obligee's assignee claim the money.
In Pennsylvania however, the assignee of a debt must sue in the name
of the assignor. The action should have been in the name of John Peters to
the use of Talcott. For this reason, the judgment is affirmed.
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WILLIAM STINE v. SAPIUEL SOBING.

Rights Df 'a

flortgagee against a Judgment Creditor .- Merger of
flortgage and Fee.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
James Harpel executed a mortgage to William Stone on his land for
$1000. The-land was worth about $1000. Later Sobing obtained a judgment against James Harpel for $900. Stone was insisting on the payment
of his mortgage when Harpel agreed to convey the land to him as payment
of it. Stone consented; the deed to him was delivered and Stone gave up
to him the bond -for $1000.
Subsequently, Sobing caused an execution to issue on his judgment and
bought the land at the sheriff's sale thereon. Stone now sues out a "scire
facias" upon his mortgage.. Sobing defends on the ground that the mortgage was satisfied by the conveyance of the land to Stone.
BEAM for the Plaintiff.
A mortgage does not necessarily merge or become extinct, by being
united in the same person with the fee. Hatz's Appeal 40 Pa. 209. Cook
vs. Brightly 46 Pa. 444.
BEL for the Defendant.
Where the title to real estate vests in the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes thereby extinguished by the doctrine of merger. Cooley's Appeal
1 Grant 401. Frick vs. Overholt 3 Pa. C. C. 538.
OPINION

OF THE COURT.

EDWARDSJ.-The question whether there was a merger of the
mortgage and the fee in this case is dependent upon whether the giving up
of the bond by Stone can be construed as an intention to so effect a merger.
From the statement of facts we are led to believe that since the mortgagor failed to have a satisfaction of the mortgage of record-it cannot be
said that Stone intended to merge the two interests by giving back the bond
to Harpel, nor do we think there is sufficient evidence to submit to the jury
the question whether there was a merger or not.
This is especially true when it has been decided by Justice Coulter in
9 Pa. 332 "that an intent to prevent a merger will be presumed whenever it
is to the interest of the party that the incumbrance should not be sunk in
the inheritence." Hatz's Appeal 40 Pa. 209. Cook v. Brightly 46 Pa. 444.
Corrow v. Headly 155 Pa. 96.
Since Stone may be presumed not to have intended a merger and Sobing has purchased the land at a sheriff's sale, he purchased it subject to
this incumberance and the mortgage was not discharged by sheriff's sale.
Act of Apr. 6, 1830. Act of May 19, 1893 P. L. 110, and according to
Greensburg Fuel Co. et al v. Natural Gas Co. 162 Pa. 78, Sobing purchased
the equity of redemption and his bid is for such sum as he is willing to pay
for the property above the amount of mortgage debt.
It therefore follows that Sobing cannot avail himself of the defence
that the mortgage was satisfied by the conveyance of the land to Stone, and
Stone can sue out a scire facias upon his mortgage and recover judgment.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Upon Ha6el's land were two liens, a mortgage to Stone, and a judg-ment in which Sobing was the plaintiff. Harp'el conveyed the land to
Stone for the mortgage debt, $1000. The land was worth but $1000, and if
Stone's purchase of it extinguished his mortgage, and made the judgment
of Sobing-for $900,-the sole lien, Stone's purchase was virtually a postponement of his lien-to the judgment. Can he have intended this result?
Clearly not. The land unencumered with the $900 lien was equal to the debt.
In getting the amicable conveyance, he was virtually foreclosing the mortgage without process of the .court. He surrendered to Harpel his bond,
since the land being accepted as the equivalent of the debt, nothing remained due upon it.
That Stone did not intend his mortgage to pass out of existence we
must assume, if he was aware of the Sobing judgment, and of the consequence of the extinction of the mortgage in promoting that judgment to
the first place as a lien. If he was ignorant of the existence of the judgment, or if the effect of the cessation of his own mortgage he ought to be
relieved of the effect, unless a loss would inequitably fall on Sobing.
If Sobing did not know of the purchase by Stone of the land he expected when he bought the land, to buy it subject to the mortgage. How
much he paid for it, we do not know. Perhaps only one dollar. No inequitable result will follow then, if he is compelled to pay the mortgage.
If Sobing knew of the purchase by Stone, he also knew that it would
be to Stone's interest to maintain his mortgage as a first lien, since otherwise he would have virtually put it out of existence for the benefit of Sobing and to his own clear disadvantage. He therefore knew that Stone did
not intend to extinguish the mortgage or that if he did ,he did so under the
influence of some ignorance or inadvertence from whose effects he could
equitably seek relief.
We cannot see then, that any hardship will fall upon Sobing, because
he is compelled to pay the mortgage. If he paid but $1.00 for the land;
that is, if he expected, when he bought it, to receive it charged with the
mortgage, he will have no reason to complain, if his expectation is not
defeated. If he thought he had caught Stone in a.blunder, from which he
would become the gainer to the amount of $1000, equity will have no reasoi
to weep when she sees-him wringing his bands-in disappointment and
chagrin.
Merger takes place, because the preservation of the two-interests as
distinct is purposeless. Ordinarily, when A has a lien on land and blso
an estate in the land, it. is useless to preserve the former. It is therefore,
treated as drowned. But, if there is a worthy purpose, the separate legal
existences of the lien and of the estate, continue. There is a worthy purpose here. It is to maintain justice, as between Stone and Sobing, to prevent the latter from gaining an unconscienable advantage over the former.
Judgment affirmed.

